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"Sometimes a hair divides the false and true."
Onfar Khayydm.
VE are beginning to harvest a crop of tax problems which have their
origin in the many foreclosure proceedings instituted at the depth of
the Depression. We have discovered that foreclosure proceedings, and
indeed, even voluntary conveyances in lieu of foreclosures, pose many
awkward problems for both mortgagors and mortgagees. May the
mortgagee upon bidding in the mortgaged property realize interest in-
come if his bid is large enough to include not only the principal of the
debt, but all or a part of the accrued, but unpaid interest? On the other
hand, if the bid is less than the mortgage debt, does the mortgagee sustain
a loss deductible for tax purposes? And, if the mortgagee has taken such
a loss, should it be treated as an ordinary loss, a bad debt, or a capital
loss? These questions are vitally important; moreover, they tie into
the cost basis to be used by the mortgagee upon any later disposition of
the property by him, and thus may determine whether he has gain or
loss upon such subsequent disposition. The mortgagor 1 also has his
problems. When and to what extent does he have a deductible loss on
account of the worthlessness or disposition of his equity in the mort-
gaged property? And is his loss an ordinary or a capital loss? Finally,
surprising as the result may appear to the layman, there may be a ques-
tion whether foreclosure has brought a capital gain to both mortgagor
and mortgagee.
This Article presents a study of the problems which face the mort-
gagor and mortgagee today under the Federal Income Tax.
iSterling Lecturer on Taxation, Yale Law School; member of New York, New
Jersey and Federal bars.
1. It is assumed that the property of mortgagors is business property or property
acquired with a profit motive. See Lloyd Jones, 39 B. T. A., Mar. 7, 1939. This is
not essential with respect to the debts of mortgagees.
1315
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
I. Interest Income Upon Foreclosure Sales
Several lower federal courts have .held that a mortgagee is in receipt
of taxable income when his bid price at a foreclosure sale includes the
interest due on the principal of the mortgage.' In Hel'ering T,. Midland
Mutual Life Insurance Company,3 the Supreme Court sustained the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in an assertion that a mortgagee was
in receipt of taxable interest when it bid at the foreclosure sale the
principal of the mortgage debt plus accrued interest, applying the amount
of the debt and the interest due to the payment of the bid, and that it
was immaterial that the value of the properties foreclosed was less than
the principal of the mortgage debt. The bid of the mortgagee was re-
garded as being the equivalent of a bid by an outsider, and, under familiar
principles of constructive receipf, the Court held that the taxpayer had in
effect received payment in full of the mortgage debt, plus interest, and had
applied the cash so constructively received to the purchase of the property
at the foreclosure sale. In reply to the taxpayer's argument that the
Commissioner's interpretation was in conflict with the realities of the
situation, and that the taxpayer had received nothing but the property,
which was in fact worth less than the principal of the mortgage debt, the
Court said, "The 'reality' of the deal here involved would seem to be
that respondent valued the protection of the higher redemption price as
worth the discharge of the interest debt for which it might have obtained
a judgment." 4
This decision has been forcefully criticised on two grounds :' that the
protection of the higher redemption price was a shadowy right in view
of the infrequency of redemptions by mortgagors; and that even assum-
ing that the possibility of recoupment is of some value, it is nothing more
than a right to recoup a loss, which should not be taxed as income.
2. See National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 369, 4 F. Supp, 1000
(1933) ; Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 33 B. T. A. 332 (1935) ; American Central Life Ins.
Co., 30 B. T. A. 1182 (1934); Ewen MacLennan, 20 B. T. A. 900 (1930); Midland
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 19 B. T. A. 765 (1930) ; Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 18 B, T. A.
359 (1929); Manomet Cranberry Co., 1 B. T. A. 706 (1925).
3. 300 U. S. 216 (1937). For comments upon this decision, see Ramsey, Mortgage
Foreclosures and Income Taxes (1937) 15 TAx MAG. 579; (1937) 50 HAv. L. Rrv.
988. Mr. justice McReynolds vigorously dissented on the ground that, "The notion that
Congress intended to tax the mere hope of recouping a loss sometime in the future should
be definitely rejected . . . Divorced from reality taxation becomes sheer oppression."
Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, 227 (1937).
4. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, 224-5 (1937).
5. Heineman, Income Tax Problems in Mortgage Foreclosures (1937) 32 ILL. L.
R v. 189. Mr. Heineman also suggests that if a foreclosure bid is to be regarded as
having the incidents of a bid by a third person, it may follow under some trust (eeds
and deposit agreements that interest may be discharged, leaving principal unsatisfied, in
cases in which there is a bid in partial satisfaction of notes and accrued interest,
lVol. 48: 13151316
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Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, said further that income
"may be realized upon a change in the nature of legal rights held, though
the particular taxpayer has enjoyed no addition to his economic worth."'
The statement is true enough as a general principle, but it misses the
point of the question whether the taxpayer in the Midland Mutual case
received taxable income. That question is determined by the character
of what is actually or constructively received, not by any comparison of
economic worth on two different dates. Mr. Justice Brandeis apparently
intended merely to emphasize the importance of "legal effect," as dis-
tinguished from the "realities" urged by the taxpayer as governing the
situation.
It should not be assumed from the Midland Mutual case that the mort-
gagee receives taxable interest income where there is a zoluntary surrender
of the mortgaged premises without any foreclosure proceedings. There
is then an exchange of the debt for the land.7 Where the property so
surrendered has a value at the time of acquisition by the mortgagee not
in excess of the principal amount of the loan, the due and unpaid interest
is not taxable income to the mortgagee.8
It is a poor argument that cannot be used by both sides: the corollary
of the rule of the Midland Mutual decision is that the mortgagor in the
situation involved becomes entitled to a deduction of interest construc-
tively paid by him. The Board of Tax Appeals has so held.' The mort-
gagee, of course, has control of the bid price, and the lesson of the
Midland Mlfutual case is available to those who have not already made
their bids." In the future mortgagees will avoid making bids auto-
matically, for purposes of bookkeeping convenience, at a figure which
includes accrued interest.
II. Distinction Between Position of 3ortgagor and Mortgagee
The first necessity in a discussion of losses of mortgagors and mort-
gagees is to distinguish between the positions of the respective parties.
Except to the extent that the capital gain and loss provision' may apply,
6. Helvering v. Midland 'Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, 225 (1937).
7. See infra p. 1326.
8. See Manhattan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 B. T. A. 1041 (1938), decided after the
Midland Mutual case, and following Helvering v. M6issouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F.
(2d) 778 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). See also Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 33 B. T. A.
332 (1935); American Central Life Ins. Co., 30 B. T. A. 112 (1934).
9. Harold f. Blossom, 38 B. T. A. 1136 (1938).
10. It has been contended that a taxpayer reporting on tie accrual basis does not
escape tax by excluding the interest debt from the bid price. Citation is made of Spring
City Foundry Co. v. Comm'r, 292 U. S. 182 (1934). But it is doubtful, as noted by
Miss Ramsey, whether this decision goes so far as to require the reporting of a tech-
nical accrual which will in all reasonable expectancy never be collected. Ramsey, Mort-
gage Foreclosures and Income Taxes (1937) 15 T.-,x N.A G. 579.
11. 52 STAT. 500, 26 U. S. C. § 101 (Supp. 1938).
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if the mortgagee reacquires the property, any deduction allowable to a
mortgagee is a deduction under the worthless debt provision of lhe
Revenue Act. 2 The mortgagor, on the other hand, is the owner of
property, as distinguished from a debt secured by the property. He must,
therefore, seek elsewhere in the Statute for his deduction. His deduction,
if any, is dependent upon the provision 3 allowing for the deduction of
losses in transactions in trade or business, or entered into for profit,
14
and the further so-called capital gain and loss provision. Worthless debts
were formerly deductible in their entirety, whereas the deductibility of
capital losses was severely limited." Worthless debts are still deductible
in full unless the debt is represented by corporate bonds, debentures, notes,
or evidences of indebtedness with interest coupons or in registered form.
10
The relationship of the bad debt, the ordinary loss and capital loss provi-
sions is, therefore, of the essence of the problems under discussion. The
attempt of mortgagees will usually be to take advantage of the bad debt
provision and to avoid the limitations of the capital loss provision; but
this is not invariably true, for a taxpayer with slim proof of a proper
charge-off may be driven to the protection of the capital loss provision
premised upon a sale or exchange of property."
III. When Is the Loss of the Mortgagor Deductible?
It is axiomatic that losses, to be deductible for tax purposes, must be
actually sustained. This requirement is often expressed in a different
way by the statement that there is no deductible loss until there is a
closed or completed transaction. Mere loss or diminution in value is
not enough to constitute a closed transaction. There must ordinarily be
a sale or other disposition of title to the property. But the definition of
a closed transaction is not such a simple matter when the question arises
in concrete cases. There may under some circumstances be a closed
transaction without any sale whenever identifiable events have occurred
which would definitely satisfy a reasonable man, as distinguished from
a taxpayer with the incorrigible hopefulness of a Mr. Micawber, that
his investment is wholly worthless.' 8 The latest Treasury Regulations
phrase this principle as follows :1 " . . . losses for which an amount
12. 52 STAT. 462, 26 U. S. C. § 23 (k) (Supp. 1938). See Brown v. United States, 95
F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
13. 52 STAT. 461, 26 U. S. C. § 23(e), (f) (Supp. 1938).
14. This distinction is brought out sharply in the case of Macdonald Engineering
Co., 35 B. T. A. 3, 9 (1936); cf. Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938);
(1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1289.
15. 52 STAT. 500, 26 U. S. C. § 101 (Supp. 1938) and previous Acts.
16. 52 STAT.-462, 26 U. S. C. 9 23(k) (Supp. 1938).
17. Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819 (App. D. C. 1936).
18. See United States v. White Dental Co., 274 U. S. 398 (1927),
19. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23(e)-1.
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may be deducted from gross income must be evidenced by closed and
completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, bona fide and actually
sustained during the taxable period for which allowed. Substance and
not wnere form will govern in determining deductible losses."20 (Italics
supplied.)
Akn honest-minded Treasury should not object to an inquiry as to
how such a sententious maxim is applied in practice. A problem quite
analogous to that of the mortgagor arose in the early and now leading
Schwarzler case."' The taxpayer tried in 1919 to abandon certain New
York City lots. There was no foreclosure, but in 1917 there had been
a City tax lien which was later cancelled. In 1919 there were accumulated
liens for taxes, assessments and interest amounting to $19,106.13, which
were in excess of the value of the lots. The Board of Tax Appeals did
its duty to vacant legal principles by sustaining the Commissioner in
denying a loss deduction for 1919 on the ground that, under real property
law, title to real property cannot be abandoned.22 After a merciful varia-
tion in a later case,' a technically minded Board soon returned in the
Greenleaf Textile case24 to the pathway of the Schwar-lcr rule. Here
again there was no foreclosure - there was merely an attempted aban-
donment of Florida real estate. The Board held that the retention of
title throughout the tax period by a taxpayer prevented the closing of
the transaction, which was essential to the deduction of loss.' The
Board still clings to this artificial doctrine."'
So much for the rule as to the time losses should be taken in cases
where the technical step of foreclosure is missing. In cases where
there has been a foreclosure proceeding, the Treasury, in a series of
General Counsel's Memoranda,2 7 stated at first that the loss of the mort-
gagor was deductible in the year of the foreclosure sale, and was not
to be postponed until the year in which the period of redemption expired.
20. This bromide is constantly obstructing clear thinking in tax cases. See PArL,
STUDIES ix FEDERAL TAXATIO.N (1937) 88; P.uTTL, SExCrED STrDEs x FFr Txm-
TIoN, SECO-ND SERIES (1938) 200.
21. A. J. Schurarzler Co., 3 B. T. A. 535 (1926).
22. The Board stated the alternative ground that any deduction to which the tax-
payer might have been entitled would be a deduction for 1917 when there was a sale
for taxes.
23. C. U. Connellee, 4 B. T. A. 359 (1926).
24. 26 B. T. A. 737 (1932), aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C A. 2d, 1933).
25. The Board mentioned Denman v. Brumback, 5S F. (2d) 2 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932),
but did not attempt to distinguish the case.
26. T. J. Bosquett, 39 B. T. A., Apr. 14, 1939; Collateral Mortgage and Investment
Co., 37 B. T. A. 630 (1938); see also Consolidated Brick Co., 17 B. T. A. 831 (1929);
Coalinga-Mohawk Oil Co., 25 B. T. A. 261 (1932), aff'd, 64 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 9th,
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 637 (1933).
27. XIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 120 (1934) (California); XIII-l Cu,. BVIL 123 (1934)
(Illinois); XIII-2 Cum. BuLu- 194 (1934) (Kansas).
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But this sensible position did not survive the test of Board approval in
the J. C. Hawkins case.2 There the Board, disregarding distinctions of
degree of title divestment upon tax sales,29 held that there could be no
closed transaction giving a deductible loss to the mortgagor until the
expiration of his period of redemption. The Treasury accepted this
legalistic conclusion,3" and its determined position is now the one stated
by the Board in the Hawkins case." The same principle has even been
applied in determining the year of deductibility for worthless stock held
by a shareholder in a corporate mortgagor. 2 As a wooden rule of thumb,
its application in such a case would seem clearly indefensible.
Against the trend of the earlier decisions stands the case of Dennan
v. Brumback s There a taxpayer, who had charged off on his books land
which had become worthless, was permitted to deduct his loss in 1922,
even though legal title to the land, pursuant to tax sale, was not trans-
ferred until the following year. The case was distinguished on the theory
that the bond issue authorization and special tax assessment making the
land worthless were identifiable events not appearing in the other cases.
But this distinction can hardly survive the recent decision of Rhodes v,.
Commissioner,34 in which the same court turned the "searchlight of rea-
son" on the principle that a loss on real estate is not deductible so long as
the taxpayer retains title. In that case, certain Florida real estate, ac-
quired in 1925, was damaged in September, 1926 and again in September,
28. 34 B. T. A. 918 (1936), aff'd per curiam, 91 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937)
see also Derby Realty Corp., 35 B. T. A. 335 (1937), involving a Michigan foreclosure.
Cf. W. Z. Morton, 38 B. T. A. 534 (1938) ; there the right of redemption was not clear
and absolute.
29. See Frederick Krauss, 30 B. T. A. 62 (1934).
30. 1937-2 Cu~r. BULL. 115" (1937), revoking the General Counsel's Memoranda.
supra note 27.
31. It is not easy to reconcile with this line of authority the case of Tompkins v.
Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), involving the purchase of real estate by
a joint adventure subject to a trust deed securing notes on the realty. The joint adven-
ture consisted of a partnership and a corporation; there was a default by the corpora-
tion adventurer, at which time the non-defaulting adventurer, the partnership, pur-
chased the real estate at the foreclosure sale to prevent greater loss. The partnership
was held entitled to a deduction; the usual situation described in the Hawkins caw-
that of a mortgagor who permits the sale of mortgaged property, buying it in on the
foreclosure sale and then attempting to take a deduction upon the sale- was held to
be different, in that it involved continuation of the old status of the holder of the property.
The case where the old status is closed "by an identifiable event having no relation to
tax avoidance!' and an entirely new relationship is commenced by the purchase of the
property in a new and distinct undertaking with reference to which future gain or los
should be reckoned was found to be dissimilar.
32. Alexander A. Altschuler ct ux., B. T. A. Memo Op. promulgated Aug. 27, 1938,
appearing in 384 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. fI 7632-C. But see I. T. 3,255, CtTyt.
BULL.. Feb. 27, 1939.
33. 58 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
34. 100 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
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1927, by hurricanes. After the second hurricane the taxpayer decided
that the property was worthless; he could find no purchaser for it, and
he refused to make further payments under his purchase contract. There
was no foreclosure of the first and second mortgages on the property,
which the taxpayer had assumed in 1925; and at that time he gave a
third mortgage to secure the payment of purchase money notes. The
sellers obtained judgment upon these notes, and the taxpayer paid the
judgment. In 1928 he received an unsolicited cash offer of approximately
$1,000 (about 1/20th of his purchase price) which he accepted; he then
assigned his purchase contract to the purchaser. The Board denied the
deduction for 1927, holding that the loss occurred in 1928. The circuit
court of appeals reversed, in an opinion which constantly emphasized
the test of a "common sense" interpretation of the tax laws.-" The court
first referred to the battle-scarred principle that the income tax law is
concerned only with "realized gains" and "ascertained losses,""0 and then
stated the exception applicable in cases of losses "which are so reason-
ably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount as to justify their deduc-
tion and in certain circumstances even before they are absolutely realized."
After disposing of the Commissioner's argument based on the small
recovery in 1928, the court discussed at length the Florida real estate
situation in 1926 and 1927, and concluded that the 1926 hurricane,
its recurrence in 1927, the collapse of Florida land speculation in the
latter year, the petitioner's unsuccessful efforts to sell in 1926 and 1927,
and his complete charge-off on his books in 1927 "were the identifiable
events that established the loss in that year." The court refused to
distinguish the loss on one of the properties involved where judgment
against the taxpayer was obtained in 1927 on account of the purchase
money notes, for the reason that the Board rested its decision largely on
the rule that a loss on real estate is not deductible so long as the taxpayer
retains title.
The Rhodes case seems to reflect the correct answer to this problem.
The term "identifiable event" has been defined as "an incident or occur-
rence that points to or indicates a loss-an evidence of a loss."*at A
deduction should be permitted, and indeed should be required, where there
is not merely a partial shrinkage of value of real estate, s but rather a
complete elimination of all value attested by the convincing identifiable
event of abandonment of the property by the owner in recognition of
complete absence of any utility or worth in his property. Such a rule
35. The Board did not discuss the question at any length, merelv citing some oi the
leading cases and relying particularly on Frederick Krauss. 30 B. T. A. P2 (1934).
36. See Lucas v. -American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 449 (1930).
37. See Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Comm'r, 94 F. (2d) 383. 384 (C. C. A. 6fl, 1933).
38. See De Loss v. Comm'r, 28 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied. -279
U. S. 840 (1929).
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accords with the recognition by the Bureau of Internal Revenue itself
that an abandonment of oil and gas rights, even with the retention of
title, justifies the taking of loss at the time of abandonment if the property
abandoned is actually worthless as a matter of objective fact."0 Numerous
court decisions are to the same effect.40 In such cases the fact that the
taxpayer's lease has not expired or been cancelled, or that he has not
obtained the consent of the public authorities to make an abandonment,
does not of itself preclude the deduction in the year of actual abandon-
ment.41  These principles have been applied to property other than real
property, and a loss allowed in the year in which there has been no
technical disposition of the property.42 It is hornbook tax law that a
deduction on account of worthless stock may not be postponed to a date
subsequent to the year in which the stock becomes worthless. 43 As inti-
mated in the Rhodes case, there has never been any sound legal basis for
a distinction in treatment between real estate losses and losses on other
types of property; identity of treatment is called for by every considera-
tion of fairness and equity.44 Moreover, the status of title to mortgaged
property is a more complicated problem than the Board has seemed to
realize. It is not unknown that a mortgagee should acquire technical
title to the property under local property law either upon default on the
mortgage or even upon the execution of the mortgage.4" This point
does not seem to have been brought to the Board's attention in any of
the cases.
39. VII-1 Cum. BULL. 168 (1928).
40. See Sam Cook, 25 B. T. A. 92 (1932) ; Belridge Oil Co., 11 B. T. A. 127 (1928);
A. H. Fell, 7 B. T. A. 263 (1927); B. G. Adams, 5 B. T. A. 113 (1926); A. L. H-uey,
4 B. T. A. 370 (1926); Kilby Car & Foundry Co., 4 B. T. A. 1294 (1926); Thomas
Thorkildsen, 2 B. T. A. 570 (1925); cf. Ingle v. Gage, 52 F. (2d) 738 (W. D. N. Y.
1931) ; Ashland Iron & Mining Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 172, 56 F. (2d) 466 (1932).
See also In re Sentinel Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 304 (1939).
41. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 34 B. T. A. 177 (1936).
42. See United States v. Hardy, 6 F. Supp. 946 (S. D. V. Va. 1933), aff'd, 74 F.
(2d) 841 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Liberty Baking Co. v. Heiner, 37 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A.
3d, 1930); Dean et al. v. Hoffheimer Bros. Co., 29 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) ;
Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 26 B. T. A. 107 (1932); Automatic Transportation Co,,
3 B. T. A. 505 (1926) ; Appeal of Dilling Cotton Mills, 2 B. T. A. 127 (1925). See also
Art Metal Construction Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 312, 17 F. Supp. 854 (1937).
43. See Darling v. Comm'r, 49 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cerl. denied, 2$3
U. S. 866 (1931); Royal Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 22 F. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927);
John Crosby Brown, 27 B. T. A. 176 (1932); Remington Typewriter Co., 4 B. T. A. 880
(1926). See also De Loss v. Comm'r, 28 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied,
279 U. S. 840 (1929). See also Bair v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 191 (E. D. Pa. 1037) ;
Charles Heiss, 36 B. T. A. 833 (1937); Walter W. Moyer, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937);
Gilbert H. Pearsall, 10 B. T. A. 467 (1928); Isidor Sack et al., B. T. A. Memo. Op.
promulgated Oct. 5, 1938, appearing in 384 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 7659-C.
44. Administrative convenience may be aided by the arbitrary rule in force, but
administrative necessities have survived the difficulties of valuation inherent in a prac-
tical test of the worthlessness of personal property.
45. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §§ 18-68.
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IV. Is the Loss of the ilortgagor an Ordinary or a Capital Loss?
The next question is whether the mortgagor sustains an ordinary or
a capital loss. It is important because ordinary losses are deductible in
full, whereas the deduction of capital losses is severely limited by the
Statute. An ordinary loss may not require a sale or exchange, whereas
"capital gains" or "capital losses" arise only from the sale or exchange
of capital assets, as that term is defined in the Revenue Act of 1938.4
Some time ago in a General Counsel's Memorandum, 7 it was ruled,
without consideration of the question whether the mortgagor had any
personal liability, that upon the loss of property by foreclosure the mort-
gagor sustains a capital loss. In a later ruling,48 affecting the status of
the creditor's loss, it was recognized that the compromise of a debt for
a cash consideration because of the inability of the debtor to pay does
not result in a capital loss, but rather an ordinary loss."2 Notwithstanding
this mortgagee ruling, the Treasury is apparently still sticking, without
refinement, to the position that the loss of the mortgagor is a capital
loss; but the Board, in a series of cases," has partially overruled this
position. In Comnmonwealth, Inc., the owner of property subject to a
mortgage deeded it to the mortgagee for a nominal consideration. There
could be no release of liability under the mortgage, since the taxpayer
had not assumed the mortgage liability, but had taken title subject thereto.
The Board held that the execution of the deed "marked the close of a
transaction whereby petitioner abandoned its title," and that the loss of
the taxpayer was not a capital, but an ordinary loss."' The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a group of cases each of which
involved a foreclosure sale for a price less than the amount of the mort-
gage, leaving nothing for the taxpayer, has affirmed the Board in treating
the loss involved as an ordinary loss. The court places its decision on
three grounds:
(1) That the intention of Congress was not to include involntary
sales in Section 117;
(2) That the word "sale" in its usual signification means a volun-
tary sale for a consideration and not a sheriff's sale in which the
46. 52 STAT. 500 (1938), 26 U. S. C. A. § 101 (a) (1) (Supp. 1938).
47. XIII-1 Cum. BuLr. 120 (1934).
48. I. T. 3121, 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 138 (1937); see also I. T. 3159, 1939-1 Cumx.
BLL 188 (1938).
49. See Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819 (App. D. C. 1936).
50. Commonwealth, Inc., 36 B. T. A. 850 (1937); Sol Greisler, 37 B. T. A. 542
(1938), aff'd mtb norn., Comm'r v. Freihofer, 102 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; HI L
Rust, Jr. et at., 38 B. T. A. 910 (1938).
51. Commonwealth, Inc., 36 B. T. A. 850 (1937). The same decision has been made
when there was no voluntary conveyance of property, but a sale under foreclosure pro-
ceedings. C. Griffith Warfield, 38 B. T. A. 907 (1938).
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owner of the property is not a party and receives no consideration;
and
(3) That the mortgagor's properties had become wholly worthless
at the time of foreclosure, so that the foreclosure sales had no reality
as sales so far as the taxpayer's equities of redemption were con-
cerned, it being impossible to sell what has wholly disappeared."-
A distinction was made in another recent decision of the Board in
the Betty Rogers case,5 3 in which the taxpayer and his wife paid cash
for property, assumed the note secured by a mortgage upon the property,
and delivered their own note secured by a trust deed on the property.
Citing the leading case of United States v. Hendler," the Board held that
the loss of the taxpayers was a capital loss because the conveyance of
the property to the mortgagee was accompanied by a surrender to the
taxpayers of their note for $38,000. Thus the taxpayers "gave i) all
their right, title and interest in the real property for the equivalent of
$38,000 . . ." The transaction was likened to a transfer of the property
to a third person for $38,000 in cash, which was then used to satisfy
the indebtedness. This would have been a sale, and the Board held that
the situation was not changed where the property was transferred directly
to the creditor in satisfaction of the indebtedness.r5 However. the Board
52. Comm'r v. Freihofer, 102 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939). See also Llryd
Jones, 39 B. T. A., Mar. 7, 1939.
53. Betty Rogers et al., 37 B. T. A. 897 (1938), aff'd, 103 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 9th,
May 1939). And see Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913, 920 (1938), to the effect
that the rule applicable in the Rogers case as to the capital nature of the mortgagor's loss
was equally applicable to the mortgagee's loss. For a case in which a solvent mortgagor
was held in receipt of taxable income by reason of a reduction of the mortgage debt, see
L. D. Coddon & Bros., Inc., 37 B. T. A. 393 (1938). For a further distinction sec Isaac
Philips, B. T. A. Memo Op. promulgated March 30, 1939, appearing in 393 C. C. 1-1.
1934 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 7254-A, in which the taxpayer acquired the property subject to a
first mortgage when he bid in the property after foreclosing the second mortgage, and
then conveyed the property to the first mortgagee, receiving as consideration a release
from his liability for taxes on the property; the Board held that the transaction was a
sale or exchange, making the loss subject to the capital loss limitation. For a further
refinement of the Rogers doctrine, see C. L. Grandsten & Co., 39 B. T. A. No. 144
(1939), holding a cash payment to the vendor as consideration for a release from liability
deductible in full by the mortgagor as an ordinary loss. See also Morris Polin, 39
B. T. A. No. 139 (1939): and compare Harold R. Smith, 39 B. T. A. No. 127 (1939),
applying the Rogers principle to the surrender by petitioner of his interest in certain
land contracts to the vendor in cancellation of his debts under the contract.
54. 303 U. S. 564 (1938), and also citing E. F. Simms, 28 B. T. A. 988, 1030 (1933).
55. Commonwealth, Inc., 36 B. T. A. 850 (1937) was distinguished on the ground
that the taxpayer in that case received nothing in consideration of the transfer of the
property to the mortgagee. The deed in Betty Rogers et aL, 37 B. T. A. 897 (1938)
mentioned a consideration of $10 and "in addition . . . full satisfaction of all obligations
secured by the deed of trust (the $38,000 note)." The deed also recited that the con-
sideration received by the grantors is "equal to the fair value of the grantors' interest
in said land." In Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938), involving "substantially
similar facts," a loss Was claimed by the mortgagee.
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is totally unsuccessful in distinguishing the Hale and Dallas Transfer
cases, cited in the opinion; in both of these cases the settlement of a debt
by partial payment was held to be an ordinary loss, and not a sale or
exchange. Assuming that the land transferred to the mortgagee in the
Rogers case did not have a value in excess of the mortgagor's liability,
the mortgagee received nothing to which he was not already legally
entitled, and it is difficult to see how anyone but a meticulously technical
tax lawyer would regard the mortgagee as a seller of the votes. On the
other hand, to treat the mortgagor as selling the land is inconsistent with
numerous cases holding, for example, that gains from the redemption of
bonds 6 or from an insurance annuity 7 are ordinary income. Nor can
the Rogers type of transaction properly be an "exchange," since the
mortgagor gets nothing of re-exchangeable value.
Even if the Rogers doctrine should be finally upheld, a large corner
has been chipped off its compass by Section 117(a) (1) of the 1938 Act,
which now allows a full loss upon the sale or exchange of depreciable
property. Therefore, even if there is a sale by the mortgagor, he will
now be entitled to an ordinary deduction with respect to the allocable
amount representing bbildings on the mortgaged property - assuning
them to be business buildings, as in the Rogers case.
V. When does the Mortgagee have a Closed Transaction?
The Treasury takes the position that the mortgagee has a closed trans-
action in the year of foreclosure, resulting in gain or loss by reference
to the market value at the date of foreclosure sale? 8 This conclusion
has two questionable aspects. The reference to market value is of dubious
legality, and more basically, it is open to reasonable doubt whether
there is a closed transaction at the time of foreclosure.
There are decisions recognizing that the mortgagee has a closed trans-
action at the time of foreclosure,,' but it must be admitted that there is
much to be said from the practical standpoint for the continuing trans-
action theory adopted by the district court in the Hadley Falls case."1
56. John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B. T. A. 463 (1932).
57. Frank J. Cobbs, 39 B. T. A., Mar. 22, 1939.
58. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23 (k)-3. See also I. T. 3121, 1937-2 Cu. BrLL.
138 (1937); I. T. 3159, 1938-1 Cumr. BYLL. 188 (1938).
59. This question is discussed infra pp. 1329-1330.
60. See Brown v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
61. Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 346 (D. Mass. 1933). The
Government's successful contention in this case was counter to its own Regulations. The
issue relevant to the present discussion involved the taxpayer's attempt to deduct a loss
arising out of the foreclosure of certain property. The district court held, despite Reg.
74, Art. 193, which was virtually identical with the present Art. 23 ( k-3 as to this
point, that the taxpayer could not deduct from its gross income the amount by whlch
either the mortgage debt or the purchase price at the foreclosure sale exceeded the fair
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This theory underlies the reorganization provisions. 2 Certainly, the theory
is alluring if its converse is to result in gain at the time of foreclosure.
There could be no more unpropitious time for the taxation of the gain
than when the mortgagee is in the doubly unfortunate position of having
a loss of income and a badly frozen asset. 3 Relief for this situation
would perhaps carry the denial of capital losses when the mortgagee
is unwillingly taking over the mortgaged property.
VI. The Result of a Closed Transaction in the Case of a Mortgagee
The position of the Treasury on the question of the type of loss sus-
tained by the mortgagee is obscurely delineated in I. T. 3121,11 and
examples are given in I. T. 3159." In the former of these rulings it
is said:
(1) Where a debt is compromised for a cash consideration be-
cause of inabiility of the debtor to pay, the creditor's loss is an
ordinary loss, and not a capital loss ;06
(2) Where the debt secured by the mortgage is compromised by
the transfer by the debtor of the title to the mortgaged property to
the creditor in exchange for a release of the debtor from his obli-
gation to the creditor, the loss of the creditor is a capital loss ;0
(3) If the mortgage is foreclosed and the creditor buys the mort-
gaged property at a price equal to the basis of the note representing
the unpaid indebtedness, no deduction may be taken by the creditor
as a bad debt; 8 and
(4) If the fair market value of the property69 is less than the
bid price, the creditor sustains a capital loss. 70
Although the difference between the basis for the debt and the bid
price is apparently an ordinary loss where the mortgagee buys the prop-
market value of the property. The court stated its inability to "see how a mortgagee,
buying the property at a foreclosure sale, can be deemed for tax purposes to have stf-
fered a loss if the property is worth less than he paid for it," and indicated that a loss
was properly allowable only upon a later sale by the mortgagee.
62. See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOM E (1936) 146.
63. It is adding insult to injury to tax the mortgagee upon the receipt of taxable
interest.
64. 1937-2 Cumt. BuLL. 138 (1937).
65. 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 188 (1938).
66. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23 (k)-3. So far we have an adoption of the
decision of Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819 (App. D. C. 1936).
67. See Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938); (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 129.
68. The emphasis here, as in the Midland Mutual case, is upon the bid price; cf.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23 (k)-3.
69. The fair market value of the property will be presumed to be the amount for
which it is bid in by the taxpayer in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23 (k)-3.
70. This is a highly doubtful point.
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erty at a foreclosure sale,7 ' the Board has held in the Bingham case,'
that a creditor has a capital loss where he reacquires property by means
of a settlement, the value of the property at the time being less than the
amount of the notes, and a release and cancellation of the mortgage and
surrender of the notes being part of the transaction. The unrealism of
the result in this case is matched only by the illogical reasoning em-
ployed to reach it. As Member Smith pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, the mortgage notes were not in reality sold or exchanged back
to the mortgagor; they were extinguished and the debt cancelled. Al-
though the majority in the Bin gham case rely upon the prior Board
decision in the Rogers case, the theories upon which the Board proceeded
in the two cases are actually irreconcilable. In the latter opinion the
Board preferred to treat the mortgagor as a seller of the mortgaged
real estate to the creditor in consideration of the cancellation of the notes.
If there was a sale of the mortgaged premises by the debtor to the
creditor, then on that analysis the creditor must have purchased the
property, giving rise to neither gain nor loss. The Board in the Rogers
case treated the transaction as a sale because the result was the same
as though the mortgagor had sold the property to a third party for cash
and applied the cash on the mortgage debt. This method of reasoning
is also inconsistent with the result in the Bingham case. If the mortgagor
sells the property to an outsider for cash, and then uses the cash to
compromise the mortgage debt, then according to I. T. 3121, the creditor
may deduct the unpaid balance as an ordinary loss. If the argument of
equivalent results is to be applied, there is no reason for a different
treatment if the mortgagee accepts the property (having a value less
than the debt) directly from the mortgagor instead of receiving cash
which has been realized by the mortgagor upon a sale to an outsider.
The woods get thicker when we discover that a mortgagee may have
gain as well as loss. The Regulations state :-
"If mortgaged or pledged property is lawfully sold (whether to
the creditor or another purchaser) for less than the amount of the
debt, and the mortgagee or pledgee ascertains that the portion of the
71. See Estate of Henry N. Brau-ner, Jr., 36 B. T. A. 884 (1937).
72. Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938). Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d)
819 (App. D. C. 1936) is distinguished by pointing out that it involved no acquisition
of property by the debtor, or any transfer of property to him, whereas in the Binlhar
case such a transfer occurred. See (1939) 48 YAI= L J. 1289.
73. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23 (k)-3. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art.
23 (k)-3; U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 23 (k)-3; U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 193; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 193; U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 153 (the first Regulation to adopt
this rule); cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 153 as previously promulgated. See also U. S.
Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 44-3. This consistent administrative interpretation of the Statute
on a debatable point may have imbedded the Regulation in the Statute. See Helvering
v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 423 (1939) ; National Home Owners Service Corp.,
39 B. T. A., Apr. 12, 1939; (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 716.
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indebtedness remaining unsatisfied after such sale is wholly or par-
tially uncollectible, and charges it off, he may deduct such amount
(to the extent that it constitutes capital or represents an item the
income from which has been returned by him) as a bad debt for the
taxable year in which it is ascertained to be wholly or partially
worthless and charged off. In addition, if the creditor buys in the
mortgaged or pledged property, loss or gain is realized measured
by the difference between the amount of those obligations of the
debtor which are applied to the purchase or bid price of the prop-
erty (to the extent that such obligations constitute capital or repre-
sent an item the income from which has been returned by him) and
the fair market value of the property. The fair market value of the
property shall be presumed to be the amount for which it is bid in
by the taxpayer in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary. If the creditor subsequently sells the property so acquired,
the basis for determining gain or loss is the fair market value of the
property at the date of acquisition.
"Accrued interest may be included as part of the deduction only
if it has previously been returned as income."
This Regulation consists of two parts :74 the first part, permitting a
bad debt deduction when the mortgaged or pledged property is sold
either to the mortgagee or an outside purchaser; and the second, call-
ing for the recognition of gain or loss where the creditor "buys in" the
mortgaged or pledged property by applying the mortgage notes against
the bid price. Apparently, there is no recognition of gain or loss pursuant
to the terms of the Regulation where the mortgaged or pledged property
is not acquired by the creditor in foreclosure proceedings. Thus where
a deed is given in lieu of foreclosure, the Regulation has no application,
and the difference between the creditor's debt basis and the value of the
property measures his gain or loss, as the case may be." The original
transaction, where the mortgage is a purchase money mortgage, and
74. Hulse, Mortgage Foreclosures Under the Federal Income Tax Regulations (1936)
14 TAx. MAG. 451.
75. Harry Payne Bingham, 38 B. T. A. 913 (1938) ; Henry Heldt, 16 B. T. A. 103.5
(1929) ; Chemical National Bank of New York, 30 B. T. A. 178 (1934). See Josephine
C. Bowen, 37 B. T. A. 412 (1938), wherein the taxpayer exchanged her entire mortgage
debt for Home Owners Loan Corporation bonds of a less face value and was allowed a
capital loss. Cf. Harold S. Denniston et al., 37 B. T. A. 834 (1938), wherein a worth-
less debt deduction was allowed, and the Bowen case was distinguished on the ground
that there was no surrender of the entire indebtedness, a new unsecured note being given
for the balance of the debt, and on the further ground that no bad debt loss was claimed
in the Bowen case with respect to the balance of the debt.
Whether or not a new note is given for the balance of the debt, the "substance," as
distinguished from the "form," of the transaction is that there is a partial loss in either
case, which is due to the permanent reduction in the value of the loan and which should
be deductible in full, if written off before acquiring the H.O.L.C. bonds. Cf. Henry R.
Huntting, 32 B. T. A. 495 (1935).
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the reacquisition are thus treated, according to their form, as two trans-
actions.7
6
The theory underlying the quoted Regulation is that when the creditor
or mortgagee buys in at a foreclosure sale, he exchanges his mortgage
notes for the mortgaged property,7  and that this exchange should be
regarded as a closed transaction with gain or loss measured by value.
But the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Midland Mutual Life Insurance
case 78 adopts as the controlling fact the amount bid at the foreclosure
sale, 9 from which it might seem to follow that (1) the basis of the
property acquired by the mortgagee is the amount bid at the foreclosure
sale and not, as stated in the Regulations, the fair market value of the
property bid in at the time of acquisition; (2) the mortgagee should have
a bad debt deduction to the extent that the basis of the debt exceeds
the amount bid at the foreclosure sale and is ascertained to be worthless
and charged off;"0 and finally (3) capital gain or loss is realized by the
mortgagee to the extent of the difference between his basis for the
portion of the debt applied against the bid price and the amount bid at
the foreclosure sale. The fair market value of the property at the time
of the foreclosure sale becomes wholly immaterial. Yet this is hardly
a more satisfactory rule flan that stated in the Regulations.
The existing Regulation puts a severe administrative valuation burden
upon the Treasury s' and the confusion which may arise if the Regu-
lation be finally upset as being in contravention of the Alidland Mutual
Life case is easily imagined. If a mortgagee resells property bid in upon
a foreclosure for more than the foreclosure bid price, he may be taxed
76. Nat Webb, Jr. et at., 22 B. T. A. 1249, 1252 (1931); Home State Bank, 15
B. T. A. 121 (1929); A. NV. Shaw, 13 B. T. A. 716 (1928). See Jacob 1. Diclinson,
Jr. et al., Ex'rs, 18 B. T. A. 790 (1930), involving a reacquisition by foreclostire of prop-
erty sold in an installment transaction.
77. See fanhattan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 B. T. A. 1041 (1938), citing on this
point Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935);
Henry Heldt, 16 B. T. A. 1035, 1037 (1929).
78. Helvering v. 'Midland 'Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216 (1937); see also
Ramsey, M4fortgage Foreclosures and Income Taxes (1937) 15 TAx MAG. 579, 5S1.
79. This was what the Commissioner unsuccessfully contended in Suncrest Lumber
Co., 25 B. T. A. 375 (1932). See Manomet Cranberry Co., 1 B. T. A. 706 (1925), ex-
plained in Henry Heldt, 16 B. T. A. 1035 (1929); Edward S. Phillips. 9 B. T. A. 1016
(1927).
80. See Brown v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
81. Helvering v. 'idland 'Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, 225 (1937); see
PAT L, STUDIES iT FDERAL TAXATI N (1937) 178; statement of Mr. A. IV. Gregg as to
discovery value quoted in PAUL AND MERTENS, LAw o FExRA :. Icom T,%AxT1o
(1934) § 21.53. This argument may easily be carried too far. The Treasury is reason-
ably experienced at valuation. The same objection may be made at several other points
of our system of taxation, but at these points one does not avoid a task because it is
difficult. See opinion of Member Sternhagen, Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore,
Ex'r, 35 B. T. A. 259 (1937). aff'd. 95 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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upon the difference between his reselling price and the bid price, although
he may already have been taxed upon the excess of the fair market
value of the property at the time of the foreclosure over the bid price.
On the other hand, if he resells the property for less than the fore-
closure bid price, the mortgagee may be entitled to a loss, although he
has already been allowed a loss8 2 equal to the excess of the amount of
his bid over the fair market value of the property at the time of the
foreclosure.8 3
Under the rule set forth in the Regulations, the loss of the mortgagee
upon a foreclosure is split into two separate parts where there is a
deficiency and the fair market value of the property differs from the
bid price.84 One part consists of the difference between the mortgagee's
basis for the principal debt and the bid price (the amount of the defi-
ciency). This would constitute an ordinary bad debt if the deficiency
were uncollectible, as one must admit it usually is,"3 unless he is "niethodi-
cally ignorant of what everybody knows.""0 The other part consists of
the difference between the bid price and fair market value of the property,
which would constitute a capital loss8 ' -or perhaps (?) gain, if the
fair: market value of the property exceeded the bid price.,
82. See, however, Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U. S. 62, 68 (1934).
83. Section 820 of the 1938 Act, and the doctrine of estoppel, may alleviate tlese
inequities, but not with respect to any period prior to 1932. See laguire, Surrey and
Traynor, Section 82o of the Revenue Act of 1938 (1939) 48 YALE L. ,. 509, 719; Kent,
Mitigation of the Statute of Limitations in Federal Tax Cases (1939) 27 CALIF. L. RLV.
109; Legis. (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 460.
84. See Brown v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), in wvhich this
point was called to the court's attention. Brief for appellant. p. 15. Dealing principally
with the question whether the taxpayer had charged off the debt, the court seeni to
approve the Regulations. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 193; at least it allowed a- an ordi-
nary bad debt deduction $34,699.73, the difference between the debt basis and the value
of the mortgaged premises at the time bid in ($98,650.73 less $63,951) for a ihinal
consideration of $50. Thus, a gain of $63,951 offset a total loss of $98,050.73. i4ut cf.
Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 346 (D. Mass. 1938) in which the
court denied the validity of U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 193 as applied to a claimed loss.
85. True, the mortgagee must show that he could not with diligent effort collect
the deficiency. See Vancoh Realty Co., 33 B. T. A. 918 (1936).
86. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 159, quoting Bentham's definition
of jurisprudence.
87. See Heineman, Income Tax Problems in Mortgage Foreclosures (1937) 32 ILL.
L. REv. 189, 193. Mr. Heineman suggests that the most feasible way to deal with this
situation is to amend the regulations so as to provide for a single bad debt deduction.
This criticism applies equally to the view based upon the Midland Mutual case. Under
both this method and the one set forth in the regulations there is a split of the transac-
tion into two parts; in the former case the dividing line is at the point of the bid price,
in the other it is at the fair market value of the property.
88. See Egbert J. Henschel et al., Ex'rs, B. T. A. Memo. Op. promulgated April 30,
1938, appearing in 384 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. fi 7236-B; cf. Brown v. United
States, 95 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) ; I. M. Davis, 2 B. T. A. 359 (1925), uvherein
the property reacquired was worth only the cost of the mortgage.
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VII. Conclusion
A summary of the confusion in the authorities will serve to show the
ridiculous hodge-podge of conflicting rules for the guidance of mort-
gagors and mortgagees in a depression period. The law and adminis-
trative rulings seem to be in the following condition:
(1) Irrespective of the fair market value of the property, a mort-
gagee constructively receives taxable income if his foreclosure bid price
includes accrued interest; the mortgagor has an equivalent item of de-
ductible, constructively paid interest. But unless the fair market value
of the property is equal to the principal debt plus accrued interest, the
mortgagee receives no taxable income if his mortgagor is obliging enough
to lose his interest deduction by deeding the property voluntarily to the
mortgagee.
(2) A mortgagor's loss on foreclosure is deductible at the time of
foreclosure sale in states, like New York, which allow no period of
redemption, but not until the equity of redemption has expired in states,
like California, which allow such a period; but if the mortgagor deeds
the mortgaged property voluntarily to the mortgagee, his loss is deductible
when he does so, wherever the property may be situated.
(3) A mortgagor's loss is an ordinary loss if his property is taken
from him by foreclosure; it is an ordinary loss if the mortgagor is not
liable for the mortgage debt and voluntarily deeds the mortgaged prop-
erty to the mortgagee; it is a capital loss if the mortgagor is liable for
the mortgage debt and secures a release of indebtedness upon his volun-
tary conveyance.
(4) The mortgagee's bad debt is deductible at the time of acquisition
of the mortgaged property; it is not postponed, as is the mortgagor's
loss, to the later date of expiration of the period of redemption. But
there is much to be said for the argument that the mortgagee has no
loss deduction whatever when he acquires the mortgaged property.
(5) If the mortgagee compromises the mortgage debt for cash with
a debtor who is unable to pay, he has a bad debt deduction, but if he
releases the debtor from obligation, in return for a conveyance of the
property, he has a capital loss. If the mortgagee forecloses, he may have
no bad debt deduction, a capital loss, both a bad debt deduction and a
capital loss, or even a bad debt deduction and a capital gain, depending
upon the relationship in amount of the mortgage debt, the bid price and
the market value of the property. But this administrative rule may be
wrong; it may be wrong if the bid price controls, as intimated in the
M1idland Mutual Life case.
(6) If the market value controls, as the Regulations state, the basis
of the foreclosed property in the hands of the mortgagee is that market
value; if the bid price controls, as intimated in the Midland Mutual Life
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case, the basis is that bid price. If the law settles in favor of the bid
price, there will be many claims for double taxation upon the resale of
the property by the mortgagee, and likewise many claims for double
deduction, except as Section 820 (operative only for years after 1931)
or the doctrine of estoppel ameliorates this confusion.
"The simple tool" of Euclidean logic"" seems to have made a bad mess
of the income tax as it affects mortgagors and mortgagees. The process
of trial and error has produced an extraordinary crop of blunders. To
use Mr. Justice Frankfurter's expression,"0 it is time for a reappraisal
of the whole situation in the light of a rule of reason, as distinguished
from transcendental rules of reasoning. The two quite different things
have been badly confounded. The result is as deplorable as may be
imagined. The uniform application of a scheme of nationwide taxation
is impaired." Litigation is multiplied for overworked courts far behind
schedule.2 No one can know when we will extricate ourselves from an
intolerable, unknown and unknowable futility.
93
The obscurity is one which does damage. It promotes justifiable tax-
payer dissatisfaction, which in itself is bad for an income tax." Such
revenue as is immediately collected will cost dearly in the long run. And
mortgagors and mortgagees deserve a better fate. They both have their
unavoidable troubles in a depression period. The former is losing his
savings; the latter is exchanging an income-producing property for a
frozen asset. We carry coals to Newcastle when we add the riddle of
conflicting decisions and the problem of a harsh denial of a tax loss
or the taxation of income which is far from being the equivalent of
cash.
There is little excuse for a prolongation and intensification of the chaos
of this situation. There is plenty of need for caution against the accep-
tance of glib woolgathering arguments in favor of tax simplification,"
but there is no need for avoidable complexity. The present disorder is
avoidable, by a statute if in no other way. One method suggested, so
far as mortgagees are concerned, is to treat acquisitions by mortgagees,
on foreclosure or otherwise, as giving rise neither to bad debt deductions
nor gain or loss, but rather as effecting a substitution of the property
89. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 306.
90. Frankfurter, Joseph Redlich (1937) 50 HAmv. L. REV. 389.
91. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND SERIEs (1938) 6.
92. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure For Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1393.
93. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure For Federal Incomne, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1393, 1410.
94. Gaskill, Preserving a Willing Attitude Among Taxpayers (1938) 16 TAX. MAa.
649.
95. See Eichholz, Should the Federal Income Tax Be Simplified? (1939) 48 YALr
L. 3. 1200. See PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES iN FEDERAL TAXATION, Second Series (1938).
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for the debt. The basis of the property acquired by the mortgagee"0
could then be the adjusted basis of the debt, increased by costs of acqui-
sition, and decreased by any payment in reduction of the principal debt
plus costs of acquisition, or any bad debt deduction allowed after the
acquisition of the property. This method would work possible hardship
by denying a bad debt deduction to mortgagees when in the great majority
of cases there is a bad debt at the time of acquisition by the mortgagee.
Another possible solution, perhaps more in accord with realities, would
be to allow a bad debt deduction at the time of acquisition, based upon
the difference between the debt basis and fair market value, which could
be presumed to be the bid price in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
and to allow the fair market value, properly adjusted, as a basis for
the property acquired. This allowance of a bad debt deduction would
be partially paid for by the mortgagee in terms of a reduced basis for
the property, but would not indefinitely postpone the opportunity to deduct
an economic loss. Whether the relatively rare case in which market
value exceeds the debt basis calls for a capital gain tax is a quite separate
problem; such cases might be handled as bargain purchases,", leaving
the gain to be taxed upon later resale, with a basis limited to bargain
purchase price meanwhile.
As things are now in the case of mortgagors, the general rule is con-
trolled by the special case. Things should be put the other way around;
we need a rule for breaking a rule."' A realistic statute could state a
useful and workable rule which recognized that redemption by mort-
gagors is sufficiently infrequent to permit the allowance of loss when
it actually occurs, and that the rare case of redemption may be covered
by special provision, such as the one we have adopted for recovered
bad debts.
96. There would have to be a further adjustment as to properties acquired before
the amendment of the Statute on account of the treatment accorded the transaction under
existing Regulations.
97. The relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee does not ordinarily con-
template that the mortgagee should be enriched at the expense of the debtor or realize
more than what would repay the debt with costs and e.x-penses; Honeynian v. Jaceobs,
59 Sup. Ct. 702 (1939). See Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936); Coma'r
v. Van Vorst, 59 F. (2d) 677 (C. C A. 9th, 1932); Delbert B. Geeseman, 33 B. T. A.
258 (1938) ; Gordon l. Evans, 38 B. T. A. 1406 (1938) ; Charles E. Adams, 39 B. T. A.,
Feb. 9, 1939. Cf. Albert Erskine, 26 B. T. A. 147 (1932).
98. Cmwozo, THE PARAoxzs oF LwM.A ScrNce (1928) 64.
